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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to 
explore how, and to what extent, the 
Arab world responded to National 
Socialist influence during the Second 
World War. This research provides a 
unique perspective- from the 
viewpoint of the British Colonial, and 
Foreign Offices- derived from primary 
records dating from the Second World 
War era, located in the British 
National Archives at Kew. This 
research offers an interesting 
perspective in the field of historical 
research focused on the Second World 
War era, more specifically focused on 
the relations between the Arab world 
and the National Socialist regime. 
Further, examining National Socialist 
and Arab relations through the lens of 
the British Colonial and Foreign 
Offices, provides a unique perspective; 
as from the perspective of the leading 
colonial power in the region, brings 
into question not only German 
intentions in the Middle East, but 
British intentions as well. 
BACKGROUND/METHODS 
This project interprets records 
retrieved from the British National 
Archives in Kew, and contextualizes 
them within the historical situation in 
the Middle East during the Second 
World War. British intelligence files 
detailing the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, as well as a series of 
memorandums exchanged from 
prominent player's in the region, such 
as the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-
Huseini, the Emir Abdullah of Trans-
Jordan, and King Ibn Sa'ud of Saudi 
Arabia. Further, documents from a 
British Colonial Office file are 
examined, containing an exchange of 
telegrams and memorandums 
between Sir Winston Churchill, King 
Ibn Saud; as well as Arab, British, 
Zionist and American officials such as; 
President Roosevelt, Sir John Philby, 
U.S. Colonel Hoskins, Anthony Eden, 
Chaim Weizman, Ibn Sa'ud, and 
others. These archival sources are 
contextualized by the writings and 
explorations of historians such as 
Aaron Gillette, Jeffery Herff, Clive 
Leatherdale and others. This project 
strives to create a behind the scenes 
look at the situations developing in 
the Middle East during the Second 
World War, through the lens of one of 
the most meticulous bureaucracies in 
human history, that of the British 
Empire. 
This specific article explains how 
relations between the Arab world and 
the National Socialist regime began to 
take shape, and the way in which 
questions of "race" and the definition 
of anti-Semitism aided in shaping such 
relations. It also provides an 
examination of how the fragmentation 
in the Arab world that resulted due to 
National Socialist influence; and how 
such relations affected the British, 
threatening their colonial power in 
the region. The factors that led to the 
opening of the forum between the 
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Arab world and the National Socialist 
regime were centered around notions 
of "race", and as a result, the National 
Socialist regime was forced to 
implement a substantial 
reconceptualization of their racial 
ideology in order to not only appease 
their allies in the war; namely Fascist 
Italy, but also to sway the Arab world 
to their cause. Furthermore, tenets of 
this reconceptualization of National 
Socialist racial ideology were 
integrated into the Nazi propaganda 
campaign implemented in the Middle 
East during the Second World War; 
designed to establish a sense of racial 
equality between the "Aryan", 
"Germanic" race, the Mediterranean 
"race", and the Arab people. 
RESULTS, DISCUSSION, AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
With the tr iumph of Rommel's 
Afrika Corpse against British forces in 
Egypt in 1942, the DNB (Deutsches 
Nachrichtenburo) proclaimed: "The 
inspired Axis General, Rommel, 
deserves the title of honour which was 
once the attribute of Scipio: Rommel 
Africanus." 1 This small drop in the sea 
of propaganda employed by the Nazi 
regime is peculiar when considering 
the nature of National Socialist 
ideology. Simply put, National 
Socialist ideology dictated that the 
"Aryan", "Nordic" or "Germanic" race 
was superior in every way compared 
to all other "races", and due to this 
superiority, merited the right to 
excessive self-assertion. This 
propaganda seems to be indicative of 
a major reconceptualization of 
National Socialist racial ideology, 
F O 1 8 8 , "Summary and C o m m e n t s on German 
Propaganda to Germany" , 1941-44. 
characterized by a fundamental 
transition from pure biological 
racialism to a racialism fusing 
spiritual and psychological factors 
with biological factors. While German 
racialists were intent on pushing the 
concept of biological racialism, and 
"Aryan" superiority, many Italian 
racialists insisted on a spiritual 
racialism, which invoked the glorious 
past of Rome, and the spiritual and 
psychological nature, which defined 
the Mediterranean "race" as a product 
of that great and ancient civilization. 
Thus a rift developed between the two 
regimes, producing the need for a 
reconceptualization of National 
Socialist racial ideology. 
It is true that throughout history, 
aspiring empires invoked the Roman 
past as an inspiration; and though this 
may be the case, it is also likely that 
this bit of propaganda is indicative of 
this reconceptualization of racial 
ideology, as well as German 
capitulation with Italian racialists. 
Whereas before, Nazi racial policy 
dictated that no other race was equal 
to the "Aryan" race, now the National 
Socialist regime had to capitulate with 
their Italian allies by way of 
establishing a sense of racial equality; 
hence the Germans invoking the 
memory of a great Roman figure in 
their propaganda as apposed to an 
"Aryan" one. The Germans not only 
needed to appease the Italians in 
terms of their racial ideology, but they 
also found that they had to redefine 
their ideology in order to placate the 
Arab world as well. 
Following The Nuremburg Race 
Laws of 1935 the fire was set for the 
intercourse that took place between 
the Arab world and the National 
Socialist regime. The Nazi regime 
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observed that diplomats from Arab 
nations expressed no antagonism for 
the anti-Semitism expressed by the 
Nazi regime, as long as it was directed 
exclusively at Jews. 2 The Arab world 
was aware of Germany's obsession 
with anti-Semitism, and naturally the 
question arose of whether or not this 
vehement hatred for Semites, also 
applied to non-Jewish Semites such as 
themselves. Hitler had made it 
perfectly clear in his renowned book, 
Mein Kampf, what he felt not only 
about non-"Aryans" but also what he 
felt about the Arab people; which 
simply put was, disdain.3 In order for 
the National Socialist regime to reach 
their goal of destroying the British 
Empire, it was imperative that they 
court the Arab world to their cause; 
and thus the redefinition of racial 
ideology attached to notions of Arab 
radical nationalism, were prescribed 
to the Arab world by the Nazi 
propaganda machine. This National 
Socialist courtship of the Arab world 
would take the form of a massive 
propaganda campaign, incorporating 
elements of both biological and 
spiritual/phsycological racialism, as 
indicative of the fundamental 
reconceptualization of National 
Socialist racial ideology respectively. 
Furthermore, with the institution 
of the 1935 Nuremburg Race Laws, 
the definition of Aryan and the 
implications upon those who did not 
constitute as a member of the Aryan 
race began to emerge further into 
concrete reality from the dark depths 
of a perverted ideological delusion. 
Following the institution of the racial 
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 15. 
3 
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans, Ralph 
Mannheim, 658-59. 
laws, in 1935, there was a case 
concerning Johannes Ruppert, the son 
of a Turkish officer and a German 
woman who was ejected from the 
Hitler youth due to his Turkish 
ancestry. According to German 
citizenship law at the time, "A citizen 
of the Reich is only that subject, who is 
of German or kindred blood and who, 
through his conduct, shows that he is 
both desirous and fit to serve 
faithfully the German people and the 
Reich." As a result of the Ruppert case, 
the Turkish embassy demanded an 
explanation from the National 
Socialist regime, and German-Turkish 
relations were threatened; as 
according to historian Jeffrey Herf, "In 
the international context of 1935," 
""placing a cloud" over Germany's 
relations with Turkey," would be a 
"likely development if the Turks were 
to be characterized as non-Aryan."4 
This incident also opened up the 
forum between Germany and other 
Arab and Muslim states including Iran 
and India, all of whom demanded an 
explanation of the National Socialist 
conception of racialism and the 
meaning of German "anti-Semitism". 
The next question, and possibly the 
most important in need of answering, 
is the question of the definition of 
anti-Semitism. 
Contained in the first wave of Nazi 
broadcasts between 1939-41 5, the 
Nazis attempted to reassure the Arabs 
of North Africa that they were well 
informed about Islam and the political 
scene in the region, and they went as 
far as to extend their profound respect 
of the Islamic cultural and religious 
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 
17-18. 
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 36 . 
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practices; not overlooking the 
opportunity to claim that "there were 
parallels and welcome affinities 
between National Socialism and Arab 
radical nationalism and the religion of 
Islam as the Nazis chose to interpret 
it."6 Essentially, despite the fact that 
the Arab "race" was in fact a member 
of the "Semitic" "race", the Nazis speak 
of the "Arab nation" united as one 
with "clean blood." 7 This notion of 
racial purity, and "clean blood" is 
indicative of this fusion of biological 
racialism and spiritual/psychological 
racialism, as on the one hand, the 
Nazis stressed the biological purity of 
the Arab people, and on the other 
hand, invoking a perception of 
equality between the Arab civilization 
and National Socialism. Thus the 
National Socialist propaganda 
machine utilized the element of anti-
Semitism as leverage to sway Arab 
leaders to their cause, as they 
differentiated the Jews and the Arabs-
both Semitic peoples- though 
excluding the Arab people from the 
category of Semite, as it related to the 
National Socialist conception of anti-
Semitism. 
With the issue of redefining race 
and anti-Semitism to accommodate 
the Arab world more or less solved, 
the Arab world became fragmented 
with supporters of both the National 
Socialist regime and the Allies. Thus a 
rift began to form in the Arab World 
between fundamentalist Arab 
nationalism as prescribed by the 
National Socialist regime, within its 
newly defined racial paradigm, and 
Arab leaders who retained their t rust 
6 Ibid. 
7 
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 
108. 
in the Allies. Further, Arab 
nationalism was beginning to spread 
throughout the Middle East, and the 
Nazi propaganda machine wasted no 
time antagonizing the British 
colonizer, and promising the Arab 
nation that freedom would be 
achieved if Arab leaders sided with 
Germany. Furthermore, the situation 
in the British mandate of Palestine, 
which was the strategic center of 
British Imperial control in the Middle 
East, was the focal point for many of 
the situations arising in the region at 
British expense, as a result of National 
Socialist influence in the Arab world. 
As the National Socialist regime 
began to threaten British interests in 
the Middle East, the British were 
forced to devote valuable attention to 
dealing with developments in the 
Middle East, in addition to the rapidly 
unfolding situation in Europe. 
Furthermore, Palestine afforded the 
most strategic significance in the 
region for the British; and the British 
were in no way planning on 
relinquishing such an important 
component of their Empire. An Italian 
broadcast in Arabic, for instance, 
proclaimed that, "the Arabs have one 
leader and he despises the British and 
defies the threats of the British 
forces—he is the Mufti,"8 
Mufti Haj Amin el-Husseini was 
utilized by the Third Reich as a titular 
figure to rouse anti-British and anti-
Zionist sentiment throughout the 
Middle East in the context of pan-Arab 
nationalism as prescribed by the 
National Socialist regime. The only 
problem with investing so much 
power and support into one individual 
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 
104. 
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is that that individual may not remain 
loyal to his patrons of support, in this 
case, the National Socialist regime. 
Further, the Mufti is the quintessential 
exemplification of an Arab leader who 
at certain points, willingly acquiesced 
to National Socialist influence. Not 
only was he pronounced leader of the 
Arab people on Italian and German 
Arabic broadcasts, but also German 
aid in the form of weapons and funds, 
were funneled into Palestine via the 
southern boarder. 
Contained in a British intelligence 
file from the Colonial Office, dated 
August 8 t h 1938, it is stated, "Early in 
November a Palestine Arab 
source...reported that consignments 
of ammunition had recently arrived in 
the South, and that a ship containing 
arms and ammunition was shortly 
expected near Gaza. This source had 
also heard that a certain amount of 
war material, including explosives and 
cartridge filling machines, had 
recently been received from 
Germany..." Furthermore, "A very 
reliable source in Cairo has reported 
that Jamal el Hussaini, when he was in 
Cairo in October, said that Ahmed 
Hussein, the Egyptian Green Shirt 
leader, had offered to recruit a 
number of young volunteers into 
Egypt and send them in small parties 
to Palestine to fight against the 
British." 9 The Green Shirt party was an 
Egyptian political party, which 
modeled and emulated its political 
organization based on other Fascist 
regimes including the National 
Socialist regime; thus it is clear from 
the British intelligence files that not 
only was Germany supporting the 
Mufti monetarily and militarily, but 
PF N E , 932/V1 (Haj) A m i n file, K V 2 / 2 0 8 4 
also an Egyptian fifth column allegedly 
offered the rebels support as a result 
of National Socialist influence in the 
region. 
Further, according to a British 
intelligence file detailing the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the founder of the 
organization, Hassan el Banna, "made 
a careful study of the Nazi and Fascist 
organizations. Using them as a model, 
he formed within the Ikhwan (The 
Brotherhood] the Gawwala and 
Katai'b, specially trained and trusted 
men who correspond respectively to 
the Brown Shirts and Black Shirts of 
the late Adolf Hitler's party t roops." 1 0 
Thus these Colonial Office files 
demonstrate how the Mufti was 
favored, perhaps exclusively, by the 
National Socialist regime, and how he 
was designated as a champion of the 
radical Islamic nationalist movement 
spreading throughout the Arab world; 
hence support from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
Within a British Colonial Office file 
dated September 1 3 t h 1939, the Mufti 
allegedly made a pro-British 
proclamation, stating "that he was 
willing to sign a proclamation 
ordering the rebels in Palestine to lay 
down their arms and declaring the 
British cause to be just." A side note in 
the same file also indicates that the 
Mufti had made no "mention of any 
conditions upon which the Mufti 
might wish to make issuing of the 
proclamation depend." 1 1 Thus it 
seems as though the Mufti was caught 
between devoting himself to the Nazis 
Polit ical Intel l igence Center Midd le East , 
"P.I.C. Paper No. 49, The Ikhwan El 
Muslemin, " Cairo (February 25 , 1944), N A , F O 
371/41329. 
1 1 PF N E , 932/V1 (Haj) A m i n file, K V 2 / 2 0 8 4 
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or the Allies, and both sides could 
sense his irresolute position. 
Furthermore, a British Colonial 
Office file dated the 3 1 s t of August 
1939, questioned the Mufti's alleged 
pro-British proclamation, but it also 
reported German anxieties over the 
Mufti's allegiance to them: "Local 
D.N.B. (Deutshes Nachrichtenburo) 
representatives were becoming 
increasingly dissatisfied with the 
Mufti's leadership. In their view his 
lack of decision at the present 
juncture was the worst feature: he 
was merely "sitting tight", yet at the 
same time showing signs of holding 
out an olive branch to the British in 
order to secure his own position in the 
future. The Germans were beginning 
to feel that they had put all their eggs 
in one basket by backing the Mufti 
exclusively, and that it would have 
been better to support also other Arab 
leaders who, although keen 
nationalists, were not blind followers 
of the Mufti."1 2 
From this document it is clear that 
via German anxiety, the British were 
aware of the weakness of National 
Socialist influence in the Middle East, 
and as a result, the British were more 
inclined to stand their ground in 
regards to the "Palestine problem"; 
their policy being the strict adherence 
to the stipulations outlined in the 
1939 White Paper, as well as the 
obstinate refusal to acquiesce either 
Arab or Jewish demands in Palestine. 
The British knew well that 
developments in Palestine would have 
serious consequences in the broader 
Middle East; threatening their colonial 
holdings in the region, and they were 
not willing to back away from their 
PF N E , 932/V1 (Haj) A m i n file, K V 2 / 2 0 8 4 
holdings as a result of National 
Socialist influence. Further, as 
previously mentioned, other Arab 
leaders sided with the allies, mainly to 
secure their own demands of 
independence in the future, but also 
due to positive experiences with 
Britain in the past. 
Emir Abdullah, the pro-British 
leader of Trans-Jordan, replies to a 
message sent to him by Mufti Haj 
Amin el-Husseini through one of his 
delegates, asserting, "although he does 
not deny that his Eminence (Haj 
Amin) is a most loyal leader of the 
"Cause" and is convinced that his 
obstinacy is due to his intense 
devotion to the "Cause", yet he feels 
that greater success would be 
obtained by the use of more 
diplomatic means. At the same time he 
realizes that all leaders deal with their 
problems in their own way, but feels 
that with greater political experience 
His Eminence would have adopted 
other methods." 1 3 From this source it 
is clear that certain Arab leaders such 
as Emir Abdullah understood that 
extreme devotion to the "Cause", 
meaning the goal of Islamist, Arab-
Nationalists, as prescribed by National 
Socialist propaganda- namely the 
destruction of the British Empire- is 
not the way in which to position 
oneself to insure that one's "bread is 
buttered." Also, according to Herf, 
"The key point was that the outcome 
of the battles was a decisive factor in 
the effectiveness of propaganda 
efforts of all the warring powers. An 
Axis victory at El Almein might have 
set off an Arab and Muslim revolt 
against the Allies all over the Middle 
PF N E , 932/V1 (Haj) A m i n file, K V 2 / 2 0 8 4 
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East." 1 4 Thus, as demonstrated by the 
British archival sources above, as well 
as Herf, Arab leaders seem to be acting 
out of self-interest when determining 
which side to support in the war 
effort. For Haj Amin, Germany seemed 
the greater side to align with, perhaps 
due to the immense power Hitler 
placed in the Mufti's hands; for Emir 
Abdullah, the British had a history of 
meeting his demands as he was 
appointed leader of a British 
protectorate, which later became 
Trans-Jordan, so naturally he would 
place his faith in the British. 
It is obvious why Arab leaders 
would align themselves with the 
victorious side in the war, and come 
1943, the odds were against Germany; 
though victory meant different things 
for different leaders throughout the 
Middle East. Haj Amin el-Husseini was 
willing to negotiate with the British, 
"but only on condition that he should 
be the head of the Arab negotiating 
body;" though it was unlikely that this 
condition would ever be accepted by 
the British; 1 5 but perhaps it would be 
part of the package if he were to side 
with Germany. As pointed out by the 
Emir Abdullah through his delegate, 
Haj Amin's "obstinacy" to refuse 
negotiations with the British, 
demanding what was clearly 
impossible, demonstrates Haj Amin's 
acquiescence to National Socialist 
courtship; though at the same time, 
Germany was becoming disenchanted 
with their titular leader in the region, 
as he seemed to be handing the British 
an "olive branch". 
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 
225. 
1 5 PF N E , 932/V1 (Haj) A m i n file, K V 2 / 2 0 8 4 
Haj Amin was proclaimed the 
leader of the Arab world in German 
and Italian propaganda, and his 
relationship with the Third Reich 
demonstrates the incredible amount 
of power and responsibility the Nazi 
regime placed in his hands. The Emir 
Abdullah on the other hand, was 
deemed by the Nazi propaganda 
machine as "'Rabbi' Abdullah, the 
buffoon of Transjordan;" and as one of 
the "Mohammedans willing to sell 
themselves to Britain and, by so 
doing," proving "false to Islam." 1 6 Thus 
despite this increase of anti-colonial 
fervor as prescribed to the Arab world 
by the National Socialist regime, the 
British still viewed themselves as 
residing in an advantageous position 
in the Middle East; as they could offer 
what the Arabs wanted; 
independence, and as long as they had 
this to offer; they had no reason to 
abandon their colonial policies in the 
Middle East. Germany on the other 
hand was not a colonial power, and 
though this situation aided them in 
their relations with the Arabs in the 
past; Germany could not undoubtedly 
claim that they could offer any Arab 
leader independence. 
Lastly, this project covers a wide 
range of original sources located at 
the British National Archives in Kew, 
and this specific article demonstrates 
how National Socialist relations with 
the Arab world developed as a result 
of a fundamental reconceptualization 
of National Socialist racial ideology, 
and how these relations affected 
developments in the Middle East, 
through the lens of the British Foreign 
and Colonial Offices. This article also 
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 
98. 
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demonstrates the existence of the rift 
between Arab leaders created as a 
result of National Socialist influence 
during the war. Finally, the further 
implications of this research endeavor 
are contingent on the execution of 
further archival research at the British 
National Archives, or elsewhere. 
These implications include the 
possible contribution to this particular 
field of inquiry, specifically National 
Socialist and Arab relations through 
the lens of the British Empire during 
the Second World War. 
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